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INTRODUCTION
Safety-critical systems are expected to satisfy a high level of dependability including reliability, availability, security and safety. Therefore standards concerned with the development of such systems require an application of specific design flows where system engineering is conducted in parallel with various safety assessment (SA) activities. Typical SA methods include hazard analysis, failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), fault-tree generation and analysis (FTA) (NASA, 2002) , formal verification (Meenakshi et al., 2007) . Although these well-established methods provide an efficient support for safety engineers, they could greatly benefit from a tighter coupling with system modelling environments.
In this context, model-based system engineering (MBSE) is a convenient approach to develop safetycritical systems (Estefan and May, 2007 ). MBSE relies upon system level models and offers convenient frameworks to integrate different dedicated analysis views within a global design environment. It becomes thus possible to perform model-based safety analysis by incorporating existing SA methods and tools into the MBSE workflow.
In this paper, we aim to contribute in integration of SA techniques into the MBSE environment based on System Modelling Language (SysML) (OMG, 2007) . SysML is a general-purpose modelling language that provides a global overview of system architecture. SysML is built as a UML profile for specifying, analyzing, designing and verifying complex systems. Certain efforts have already been put into investigation of possible ways of SA application through the MBSE process based on SysML (David et al., 2010) . Similar studies are also undertaken with other modelling languages such as Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) (Feiler et al., 2012) or EAST-ADL.
In this paper, we address formal approaches applied for automatic FT generation and analysis at the preliminary safety assessment phase. We leverage features of SysML to capture information required to conduct formal analysis in MBSE. For this reason, we propose a safety modelling framework for FT generation and analysis (SMF-FTA) including metamodels, profiles, model transformation, verification and FTA tools. The FTA results can be further used for the evaluation of different system architectures and their optimization according to certain safety goals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explore state-of-the-art in SA techniques and tools for FTA. In section 3, we introduce our method and toolset for automatic FT generation and analysis. In section 4, we present experimental results and conclude in section 5. (NASA, 2002) use manually created models of failure behaviour. Such approaches rely upon the ability of the SA engineer to predict the system behaviour and, consequently, may lead to higher probablity of errors. Another group of FT generation approaches (for example, HiP-HOPS (Walker et al., 2007) is based on the use of analytical expressions associated with the system components to model the possible propagation of failures. Approaches based on failure modes injection extend each component of the nominal system model with a set of possible failure modes and then model the system failure behaviour using such an extended model. The tools based on these approaches (for example, FSAP/NuSMV (Bozzano and Villafiorita, 2007) ) translate an extended model into a state machine and then use formal verification algorithms to generate FTs. We list here only academic approaches, since industrial solutions generally rely on part of them. Although tools mentioned above (Walker et al., 2007) , (Bozzano Villafiorita, 2007) perform automatic FT generation, they lack convenient representation of the input system models and final results of SA. For example, FSAP/NuSMV or ARC (ARC, 2012) tools use formal languages such as SMV or AltaRica to describe a system which might require certain time efforts from the SA engineer. In HiP-HOPS, safety annotations can be entered through a profile of the EAST-ADL implementation in Papyrus, but there are no elaborated mechanisms to show the results of SA in the system models.
In this work we analyze the possibilities of using different methods and tools for automatic FT generation, analysis and visualization across the MBSE process. We propose to combine the analytical approach with formal verification methods to automatically generate FTs derived from the SysML models. We represent a safety modelling framework for FT generation and analysis, called SMF-FTA. SMF-FTA enables the use of formal verification and FTA algorithms during the MBSE process supported by the Papyrus (Papyrus, 2012) editing tool for SysML. Furthermore, it implements an ability to visualize FTA results in the SysML modelling environment. SMF-FTA contains model transformation tools, the ARC tool for formal verification and the XFTA tool for FTA, as well as the AltaRica (Arnold et al., 2000) and Open-PSA (Open-PSA, 2008) metamodels and the profile for FT visualization. In the next sections, we shall describe the SMF-FTA architecture and show how the tool can be used for the FT generation and analysis.
SAFETY MODELLING FRAMEWORK
The architecture of SMF-FTA is represented in Figure 1 . It has been implemented using java under Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) and includes a set of tools for FT generation and analysis. The FT generation method and tool flow associated with SMF-FTA include several steps. First, a system under analysis is designed with Papyrus platform using SysML block and internal block diagrams. Then a SysML model of a system is annotated with the possible failure behaviour. Once the annotation has been done, the failure modes of every block are automatically extracted from the output deviation expressions, and the SysML model is converted into the AltaRica language. The checking of the AltaRica model is performed by the ARC tool using an automatically generated script. This script allows ARC to generate minimal cut sets for the considered model. Based on this information we automatically create FTs and represent them in the Open-PSA format. Finally, with the XFTA tool we can perform FT quantitative analysis. In order to make SA results more representative, we visualize FTs in SysML modelling environment using dedicated FT profile. 
Model Annotation
A model is described in SysML using block and internal block diagrams that can be further annotated with system failure behaviour. This behaviour is represented as a set of analytical expressions showing how deviations in the block outputs can be caused by internal failures of the block and/or possible deviations in the block inputs. We assign output deviation expressions by adding OpaqueExpressions into the Default Description of output ports of the appropriate block.
Model Conversion
The transformation method used for conversion of SysML model to AltaRica relies upon the MBSE approach. First, a SysML model is verified if it conforms to the standard SysML metamodel and then model to model transformation takes place. In order to verify if a new generated AltaRica model conforms to the AltaRica concepts, we developed the AltaRica metamodel using Ecore package for EMF. Table 1 lists the transformation rules used in the algorithm implemented in SMF-FTA. In AltaRica, a system is represented as a state machine composed of the set of nodes N = {n 0 , n 1 ,..., n m }. Each node n i = {F in , F out , S, E, T, A} contains a set of input F in and F out output flows, a set of states S a set of events E a set of transitions T and a set of output assertions A.
In SysML, a system can be considered as a set of blocks B = {b 0 , b 1 ,..., b m }, where each block b i = {P in , P out , D} contains a set of input P in and output P out ports as well as a set of output deviation expressions D linked to the output ports of the blocks. Each expression contains a set of failure modes M and a subset of corrupted inputs P' in of
Consequently, each block b i of the SysML model is translated into the AltaRica node n i as follows. The input and output ports are translated into the corresponding flows: P in → F in , P out → F out . Failure modes extracted from the output deviation expressions are converted into the node's states and events appearing during the transition to these states: M→S, M→E. We assume that a system under consideration is operating normally, thus all extracted states are initialized as "false" in AltaRica.
The node's transition  t j  T is generated the following way: (s a =false) |-e → (s a =true), where e  E is an event resulting in the occurrence of failure mode associated with the state s a  S.
In AltaRica, the correct behaviour of the nodes is described using analytical expressions. These expressions are simply a logical negation of output deviation expressions: D →A.
Fault Tree Generation and Analysis
SMF-FTA exploits formal algorithms realised in the ARC tool to generate all possible minimal combinations of component failures violating a given failure event. This allows us to group these combinations, called minimal cut sets, in a fault tree structure as follows. The events from each minimal cut set are considered as basic and grouped using AND gates. Then we connect all the AND gates to the OR gate which, in turn, is linked to the top event. Thereby, we provide a convenient way of representing series of events that result in occurrence of a considered top event.
FTs are generated in open-PSA format and can be further analyzed with XFTA tool. This tool performs quantitative analysis of FTs and provides information on top event probability for different mission times, importance factors of basic events, common cause analysis, etc. The FTs can be represented either in open-PSA format, the FT specific format developed for describing complex FTs, or in a graphical form with dedicated SysML profile.
EXAMPLE OF SMF-FTA USE
In this section, we illustrate the FT generation and analysis flow associated with SMF-FTA. We consider an example of a train detection system (TDS) that has been studied in (Andrews and Henry, 1997) . The system shown in Figure 2 describes a situation when there is no train in the section. In this case generator G1 excites Relay core, which in turn attracts the Contacts, so that Signal Circuit for Green light is closed. Thus, Green light is on and Red light is off. We consider a situation when "The Green light is off when a train is not present". In other words, this will be a top event of the FT. In Figure 3b we represent the TDS architecture described using SysML internal block diagrams.
Having created a SysML model of TDS, we annotate output ports of each block with output deviation expressions. Information on the failure modes and events is extracted from these expressions when the SysML model is converted into AltaRica according to the rules given in Table 1 . The results of such a transformation are shown for the main node of AltaRica model (Figure 3) .
We use ARC to build a FT corresponding to the considered top event. This FT can be also represented in a graphical form using our FT profile ( Figure 4 ). As shown in the FT, the top event occurs if any of the G1, Train_Axle, Relay, ContactsP or Green components fails. A quantitative analysis of the obtained FT is conducted with the XFTA tool. As an example, we assess the probability of the top event based on the failure rates of basic events. We find that the probability that "The Green light is off when a train is not present" equals 2.63×10 -3 .
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we addressed the problem of the integration of formal approaches for automatic fault tree generation within a SysML-based engineering workflow. We described a safety modelling framework for fault tree generation, analysis and visualization providing a convenient and uniform environment for safety engineers by automating certain phases of the safety assessment process.
